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The 
Kahan Report 
Justice Denied 
On September 28, 1982 the Israeli 
Cabinet resolved to establish <;l 
commission of inquiry pursuant to 
Israel's Commission of Inquiry Law 
of 1968, largely in response to the 
largest protest demonstration ever 
held in Israel 's history. The charge 
to the commission was to examine 
"all the facts and factors connected 
with the atrOCity carried out by a unit 
of the Lebanese Forces against the 
civilian population in the Shatila and 
Sabra camps." The selected chair-
man of the commission was Yitzhak 
Kahan, President of the Israeli 
Supreme Court. 
The Begin administration was 
compelled , despite its obvious 
reluctance, to estab lish the Com-
mission in response to international 
outrage over the massacres and 
internal domestic protests against 
Israeli involvement , wh ich was 
gradually revealed in the press after 
initial denials by the Begin govern-
ment of any involvement in the 
massacres. By February 9, 1983, 
when the Kahan Report was re-
leased, the massacres had already 
been absorbed into the morass of 
tragedies which had occurred and 
still are occurring in Lebanon. But 
with the issuance of the Report, the 
controversy was rekindled on a new 
level-focusing on the individual 
responsibility of many high-ranking 
Israeli officials , including former 
Prime Minister Begin, then Minister 
of Defense Sharon , and then 
Foreign Minister Shamir. A brief 
flurry of reprimands, to the extent 
they can be nominated as such, 
by Linda A. Malone* 
followed-a few military and military 
intelligence personnel lost their 
positions; Sharon, one of the most 
harshly criticized individuals in the 
Report, lost his portfolio. The Report 
was heralded as a triumph of 
democracy, a testing and reaffirma -
tion of the principles upon which 
Israel was founded. The conscience 
of a nation (or perhaps nations-
including the United States) was 
appeased. 
A fundamental miscon-
ception of the Report Is 
that It was a resolution of 
national and Individual 
/lability for the massacre 
under principles of Inter· 
national law and human 
rights. It was not, nor did 
It purport to be, such a 
resolution. 
Was there then justice tor the 
Palestinians? Did the Report place 
blame on the guilty parties, and 
impose or demand punishment 
appropriately? Without question, 
from an international law perspec-
tive, the answer is no. A fundamental 
misconception of the Report is that it 
was a resolution of national and 
individual liability for the massacre 
'Lin da A. Malone is Associate Professor of 
Law at the University of Arkansas. 
c 1983 Linda Maione. Reprinted by 
permission of the author. 
7 
under prinCiples of international law 
and human rights. It was not, nor did 
it purport to be, such a resolution. 
Before examining the responsibility 
of Israel and its officials under 
international law, it is necessary to 
review briefly relevant portions of 
the Report's analysis and conclu -
sions. 
The Commission 's factual inquir-
ies and conclusions relate only to 
the events of September 16-18, 
1982, not to the overall illegality of 
the invasion or its aftermath. Also, 
although the resolution authorizing 
the Commission speaks of the 
atrocities carried out by "a unit of the 
Lebanese forces," that is, the 
Phalangists, the Commission did 
attempt to determine who in fact 
carried out the massacres. And, as 
is ord inarily the case with any 
tribunal, the Commission attempted 
to determine the facts, draw infer-
ences from the facts, and ultimately 
reach conclusions of responsibility. 
For purposes of determining the 
issues of responsib ility under 
international law, it is not necessary 
to scrutinize the facts and factual 
inferences drawn by the Commis -
sion. It is not necessary to do so, for· 
even assuming the correctness of 
these factual assumptions, clear, 
grave violations of international law 
were committed by the investigated 
Israeli officials. Briefly, however, 
some mention must be made of the 
more questionable factual assump-
tions. 
(Continued) 
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Although the link between the 
Phalangists and Israel is frank ly 
acknowledged , Israel 's support. 
indeed its creation of Major Haddad 
as a military power in Lebanon, is 
not acknowledged except to the 
extent that the Report notes Haddad 
did not proceed north of the Awali 
River " purs uant to IOF orders ." 
Secondly, on September 16, the IOF 
(that is the Israeli army) military 
operational order number 6 was 
issued , sta ting : "The refugee camps 
are not to be entered. Searching and 
mopping up the camps will be done 
by the Phalangist l Lebanese army." 
Shatila Camp. September 20. 1982. 
The entry of the Phalangists into 
the camps was supposedly agreed 
upon by Minister of Defense Sharon 
and Chief of Staff Eitan in the 
evening of September 14. The 
Report ultimately concludes that 
Prime Minister Begin knew nothing 
of these decisions, although it 
concedes that it is "ostensibly 
puzzling" that the Defense Minister 
did not inform the Prime Minister of 
the Pha langists' entry into the 
camps, and that Begin purportedly 
knew nothing of the plan until a 
Cabinet meeting at 7:30 p.m. on 
Thursday, the 16th, at which he 
raised no objection. Moreover, in his 
deposition before the Commission, 
Chief of Staft Eitan stated that Begin 
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called him between 9:00 and 10:00 
a.m. on Saturday to tell hi m of 
American complaints about report 
from the Gaza Hospital. Begin said 
that he did not recall this conversa-
tion . 
Yet the most implausible factual 
determination in the Report is that 
the IDF, including the Chief of Staff, 
were unable to see or perceive 
anything of what was going on in the 
Shatila camp from the forward 
command post on the roof of a five 
(actually seven) story building 200 
meters southwest of the camp, even 
with the aid of binoculars. A Time 
article (September 24) said that 
journalists kept outside of the camp 
could hear the one-sided gunfire. 
The Chief of Staff himself acknow-
ledged in a meeting the morning of 
the 16th that the IDF had sur-
rounded the camps. In Going All the 
Way: Christian Warlords, Israeli 
Adventurers, and the War in Leba-
non, Jonathan Randal says, " In its 
only obviously wrongheaded factual 
error, the Kahan Report insisted 
Israeli troops couldn't see into the 
camp's alleyways even with giant 
telescopes on the command post 
roof. Journalists who climbed the 
seven-story building had no such 
difficulty with their own naked-eyes." 
This factual assumption is obviously 
crucial because it refocused the 
Commission 's inquiry into the 
responsibility of personnel on the 
scene from a question of their actual 
knowledge to a question of what 
they should have known. 
Putting these questions aside, the 
following facts are established in the 
report: 
1. An IDF order was issued on 
September 16 prohibiting the IDF 
from entering the camps with 
"searching and mopping up to be 
done by the Phalangists/Lebanese 
army." 
2. Chief of Staff Eitan and Minis-
ter of Defense Sharon agreed to 
have the Phalangists enter the 
camps on September 14. 
3. On September 15, Chief of 
Staff Eitan went to Phalangist 
headquarters and told the Phalan-
(Continued) 
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gist commanders that they were to 
enter the camps and that a Phalan-
gist liaison officer was to be located 
at the Israeli 's command post under 
the command of Brigadier General 
Yaron, another Israeli officer inves-
tigated by the Commission. 
4. In the morning of Wednesday, 
September 15, the Minister of 
Defense, the Chief of Staff, the 
Director of Military Intelligence, a 
representative of Massad, Brigadier 
General Yaron, and Major General 
Drori met at the Israeli command 
post for the Chief of Staff to report on 
his arrangements with the Phalan-
gists. During the meeting the 
Defense Minister spoke twice to 
Begin by phone. Immediately after-
ward the Defense Minister went to 
the Phalangist headquarters with 
the Director of Military Intelligence, 
representatives of Mossad, and 
others and informed the Phalangists 
that they should maintain contact 
with Major General Drori regarding 
their modes of operation. 
5. Later that day, Major General 
Orori met with the Phalangists and 
told them to enter the camps from 
the direction of Shatila. 
6. In a meeting the morning of 
September 16, the first day of the 
massacre, the Defense Minister and 
Chief of Staff met. Eitan said the 
camps were surrounded and the 
Phalangists were to go in at 
11 :00-12:00 p.m. The Minister of 
Defense said he would send the 
Phalangists into the camps. Sharon 
spoke to Begin by phone, but 
purportedly said nothing about entry 
into the camps. 
7. At 11 :00 a.m. on the 16th, the 
Phalangist commanders met with 
Major General Drori and it was 
agreed they would enter the camps 
and coordinate their action with 
Brigadier General Yaron that after-
noon. It was agreed that there would 
be 150 Phalangists to enter from 
south to north and from west to east. 
It was also established that there 
would be a Phalangist liaison officer 
on the roof. General Yaron set up 
lookout posts on the roof of the 
forward command post and on a. 
nearby roof "even though he knew it 
was impossible to see very much of 
what was going on in the camps 
from these lookouts." 
8. On September 16, the Defense 
Minister issued a document on West 
Beirut's entry to the Chief of Staff, his 
deputy and the Director of Military 
Intelligence saying "the IDF shall 
command the forces in the area. For 
the operation in the camps the 
Phalangists should be sent in." 
9. At approximately 6:00 p.m ., 
Thursday, September 16, the Pha-
langists entered the camps. 
10. The Report determined that it 
was foreseeable that the entry of the 
Phalangists into the camps was 
likely to result in a massacre. 
These are only the facts (as 
accepted by the Commission) pre-
ceding the entry of the Ph alan gists 
into the camps. They establish that 
the Phalangists entered the camps 
with the encouragement, coopera-
tion, and assistance of the Israeli 
officials, obviating for present 
purposes any ~econdary inquiry into 
whether the Israelis should have 
known or did know later what was 
going on in the camps. The Com-
mission did find among other 
subsequent events that the IDF 
provided mortar and aircraft illumi-
nation for the Phalangists to oper-
9 
ate, and that on Friday afternoon 
Brigadier General Yaron, Major 
General Drori and Chief of Staff 
Eitan met with the Phalangist staff, 
agreed to let them "continue action 
mopping up ... " until 5:00 a.m. 
Saturday, and agreed to provide the 
Phalangists with a tractor "to 
demolish illegal structures." 
Given these facts from the Report 
itself and limiting this 'analysis to 
those facts preliminary to entry into 
the camps, the next step is to 
examine the determinations of 
Israel's responsibility by the Com-
mission compared with Israel's 
responsibility under international 
law. The Commission devised two 
levels of responsibility-direct and 
indirect. Its conception of the 
differences between the two muted 
Israel's responsibility. According to 
the Commission, those directly 
responsible were only those who 
actually perpetrated or planned the 
massacre itself . Accordingly, it 
concluded that "the atrocities in the 
refugee camps were perpetrated 
by ... the Phalangists, and that ab-
solutely no direct responsibility 
devolves upon Israel or upon those 
who acted in its behalf." In reaching 
this conclusion the Commission 
determined: 
1. No other military force was 
seen by witnesses in the area of the 
(Continued) 
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camps or at the time of the entrance 
into or exit from this area. 
2. Major Haddad's forces were 
not involved because: (a) there was 
testimony that no unit of that force 
had crossed the Awali that week: (b) 
the relations between the Phalan-
gists and Haddad's forces were 
poor; (c) Haddad's arrival at the 
airport on Friday was unrelated to 
the massacres; and (d) some 
members of the Phalangists had 
Moslem names and southern Leba-
nese accents as reported by several 
witnesses. 
3. There was no reason to 
conclude IOF soldiers were in the 
camps based on a lost IOF dogtag 
found in the camp and the place-
ment of cluster bombs (in them-
selves a violation of US/ Israeli 
agreements yet used by the Israelis 
in the invasion) as booby traps 
under the bodies. 
If, as the Report acknowledges, 
the Israeli officials planned and 
aided the Phalangists in the entry 
into the camps, and the Israeli 
officials knew or should have known 
that a massacre was likely to result , 
then why wasn't Israel directly 
responsible? According to the 
Report, because the Israeli officials 
did not allow the Phalangists to enter 
with the intent that a massacre take 
place or as part of a plan with the 
Phalangists for a massacre to take 
place. A recent book, The Battle of 
Beirut by Michael Jansen, makes a 
convincing argument that in fact 
there was such a plan and intent. 
Yet, whether the Israelis let in the 
Phalangists when they knew or 
should have known that a massacre 
would result, or let them in pursuant 
to a plan or with intent for a 
massacre to take place, the result is 
the same under international law-
Israel bears responsibility, without 
direct or indirect distinctions. 
The Report does conclude that 
Israel was ind irectly responsible for 
the massacres: 
... The decision on the entry of the 
Phalangists into the refugee ,camps 
was taken without consideration of 
the danger-which the makers and 
executors of the decision were 
obligated to foresee as probable-
that the Phalangists would commit 
massacres and pogroms against the 
inhabitants of the camps, and without 
an examination of the means for 
preventing this danger. Similarly, it is 
clear from the course of events that 
when the reports began to arrive 
about the actions of the Phalangists 
In the camps, no proper heed was 
taken of these reports, the correct 
conclusions were not drawn from 
them, and no energetic and immedi-
ate actions were taken to restrain the 
Phalangists and put a stop to their 
actions. This both reflects and 
exhausts Israel's indirect responsi-
bility for what occurred in the refugee 
camps. 
Whether the Israelis let In 
the Pha/anglsts when they 
knew or should have 
known that a massacre 
would result, or let them 
In ... with Intent for a 
massacre to take place, 
the result Is the same 
under Intematlonallaw-
Israel beaTS 
responsibility . .. 
Shortly before its decision on 
Israel's indirect responsibility is the 
only paragraph addressed to the 
ramifications of the Report's con-
clusions under international law: 
It is not our function as a commis-
sion of inquiry to lay a precise legal 
foundation for such indirect respon-
sibility. It may be that from a legal 
perspective, the issue of responsi-
bility is not unequivocal, in view of the 
lack of clarity regarding the status of 
the State of Israel and its forces in 
Lebanese territory. If the territory of 
West Beirut may be viewed at the time 
of the events as occupied territory-
and we do not determine that such 
indeed is the case from a legal 
perspective-then it is the duty of the 
occupier, according to the rules of 
usual and customary international 
law, to do all it can to ensure the 
public's well being and security. 
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The principle of customary inter-
national law of belligerent occupa-
tion to which the Report refers is 
also embodied in the Fourth Geneva 
Convention of 1949 relating to the 
status of the civilian population in 
areas under military occupation as a 
result of war. Israel is a signatory to 
the Convention, having ratified it in 
1951 . Article 27 of the Convention 
stipulates that the civilian population 
must be protected, especially 
against all acts of violence or threats 
thereof. The "lack of clarity" referred 
to in the Report as to Israel's 
obligations as an occupying power, 
is a lack of clarity in Israel's eyes 
only. Israel has contended that it is 
not an occupying power in Lebanon 
as defined by international law on 
the grounds that it has not estab-
lished a military government in the 
area it controlled and that its 
presence was temporary. No inter-
national legal authority agrees with 
its position, The United Nations, the 
International Committee of the Red 
Cross, the AdviSOry Committee on 
Human Rights in Lebanon, other 
respected international law authori-
ties, as well as the United States, 
view Israel as a belligerent occu-
pant of Lebanon and therefore 
bound by the international law of 
occupation. Indeed, on July 13, 
1983, Israel's own High Court of 
Justice ruled in a case concerning 
the status of detainees Israel holds 
in Lebanon that the Geneva Con-
ventions apply and that Israel is an 
occupying power in Lebanon. 
Article 43 of the Hague Regula-
tions requires the occupying power 
to take all measures in its power to 
restore and ensure as far as 
possible, public order and safety. 
More importantly, Article 29 of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention pro-
vides that the party to the conflict , 
here Israel, in whose hands pro-
tected persons may be, is respon-
sible for the treatment accorded to 
them by its "agents" without regard 
to any individual agent's responsi-
bility. The Phalangists entered the 
camps at the instigation of Israeli 
officials, with their encouragement 
and support. Without Israel's ac-
(Continued) 
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quiescence and support, the' Pha-
langists' entry into the Israeli-
surrounded camps would have 
been impossible. The extent of 
Israeli control of the Phalangists is 
reflected in the testimony of Chief of 
Staff Eitan that on September 15 he 
"ordered the Phalangist comman-
ders to effect a general mobilization 
of a/l their forces, impose a general 
curfew on all areas under their 
control , and be ready to take part in 
the fighting." Regardless of whether 
there was intent or a plan with the 
Phalangists to effectuate a massa-
cre, Israel is responsible for the 
actions of the Phalangists acting as 
their agents in the camp. Moreover, 
if we assume, contrary to the finding 
of the Report, that Haddad's forces 
were also involved in the massacre, 
their involvement would indepen-
dently and unquestionably render 
Israel liable for their actions in the 
camp. 
Thus far, this analysis has ad-
dressed only in part the responsibil-
ity of Israel as a state for the 
massacres. For the nine individuals 
subjected to inquiry by the commis-
sion-Prime Minister Begin, De-
fense Minister Sharon, Foreign 
Minister Shamir, Chief of Staff Eitan, 
Director of Military Intelligence 
Saguy, the Head of Massad, Major 
General Drori, Brigadier General 
Varon, and Sharon'S aide Duda'i-
their personal liability under inter-
national law for the massacres 
would be determined primarily by 
the Nuremberg Principles, affirmed 
by the United Nations General 
Assembly and acknowledged as 
part of customary international law 
by the Supreme Court of Israel in the 
Eichmann case. 
Article 6(a) defines "crime against 
peace" to include "planning, pre-
paration, initiation or waging of a war 
of aggression, or a war in violation of 
international treaties, agreements or 
assurances, or participation in a 
common plan or conspiracy for the 
accomplishment of any of the 
foregoing." Article 6(b) defines the 
te~m "war crime" to include "murder 
Sharon 
Eitan Ororl 
Sharon. Eitan (I). Orori: " .. . the Phalang ists' entry into the camps and their 'mopping up' 
were viewed as an integral and necessary part of the invasion . .. " 
[and] ill treatment ... of civ il ian 
population of or in occupied territory 
•.. not justified by military neces-
sity" and Article 6(c) defines a 
"crime against humanity" to include 
"murder, extermination ... and other 
inhumane acts committed against 
any civ ilian populat ion .... " The 
same article provides that "leaders , 
organizers, instigators, and accom-
plices participating in the formula -
tion or execution of a common plan 
or conspiracy to commit any of the 
foregoing crimes are responsible for 
11 
all acts performed by any persons in 
execution of such plan." 
The Israeli invasion of Lebanon 
was a clear-cut violation of custom -
ary international law. the UN Charter 
and several resolutions against 
aggression pursuant to the Charter 
Begin himself has acknowledged 
that the invasion was not a war of 
self-defense As perpetrators of a 
"crime against peace," the leaders. 
organizers and others acting to 
(Continued) 
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formulate and execute the invasion 
are responsible for all acts per-
formed by any persons in execution 
of the invasion. From media reports 
and the Kahan Report itself it is clear 
that the Phalangists' entry into the 
camps and their "mopping up" were 
viewed as an integral and neces-
sary part of the invasion of Lebanon 
from its inception, for which the 
involved Israeli officials are respon-
sible under Article 6. Sharon insisted 
the entry into the camps was 
necessary to rid them of 2000 
terrorists that never materialized. 
As perpetrators of a "crime 
against peace," the 
leaders, organizers and 
others acting to formulate 
and execute the Invasion 
are responsible for all acts 
performed by any persons 
In execution of the 
Invasion. 
Aside from their responsibility 
predicated on the illegal invasion, 
and with only the possible exception 
of the head of Massad and Duda'i, 
whom the Commission absolved, 
the other individuals by the Report's 
own determinations would be res-
ponsible for war crimes or crimes 
against humanity. Under customary 
international law, . an official or 
commander who "has actual know-
ledge, or should have knowledge, 
through reports received by him or 
through other means, that troops or 
other persons subject to his control 
are about to commit or have 
committed a war crime and fails to 
take the necessary and reasonable 
steps to insure compliance with the 
law of war, is responsible for such 
crimes." The Kahan Report con-
cluded preCisely that-that Begin, 
Sharon, Shamir, Eitan, Saguy, Drori 
and Yaron should have known of the 
likelihood of a massacre, and either 
failed 10 prevent the entry of the 
Phalangisls into the camps and/ or 
failed to take steps to restrain the 
Phalangists once the massacres 
had begun and information to that 
effect was received. 
Article 146 of the Geneva Con-
vention also obligates the United 
States to bring any party suspected 
of a "grave breach" as defined in 
Article 146 before an American 
court for prosecution if the party 
should enter the United States' 
territory. Israel, therefore, is not 
alone in failing to seek justice under 
international law. Also, under com -
mon Article 1 of the Geneva Con-
ventions it would appear the United 
States has a responsibility to ensure 
compliance with the Conventions by 
contracting parties such as Israel. 
There may be other bases for 
responsibility of the United States 
under international law by virtue of 
its relationships with Israel. In The 
Battle of Beirut, Jansen makes a 
very convinCing argument for 
Alexander Haig's advance know-
ledge and encouragement of Sha-
ron in the invasion. Former Presi -
dent Carter stated to the press that 
he believed Washington had given 
Israel approval for the invasion. The 
deeper the extent of the United 
States' acquiescence in the inva-
sion and in Israel's unlawful use of 
American weaponry, the greater the 
potential for individual responsibility 
for United States officials as accom-
plices in crimes against peace and 
humanity, and war crimes. 
This analysis has not addressed 
the many other questions of respon-
sibility under international law for 
parties other than Israel and Israeli 
officials because the Kahan Report 
confines its inquiry in such a 
manner. I have touched on a few 
aspects of the United States' 
involvement only as they might 
relate to Israel's own involvement 
but not, for example, in terms of the 
United States' relationship with the 
Phalangists or the Gemayel regime. 
The Commission examined docu-
ments on this point, incorporated as 
Appendix B to the Report, which was 
not published "in the interest of 
protecting [Israel's] security or 
foreign relations." With this back-
ground, the Commission 's projec-
tions as to future issues of the 
United States' involvement are 
worth repeating: 
It should ... be noted that in meet-
ings with US representatives during 
the critical days, Israel's spokesmen 
repeatedly requested that the US use 
its Influence to get the lebanese 
army to fulfill the function of main-
taining public peace and order in 
West Beirut. but it does not seem that 
these requests had any result. One 
might also make charges concerning 
the hasty evacuation of the multi-
national force by the countries whose 
troops were in place until atter the 
evacuation of the terrorists . We will 
also not discuss the question of when 
other elements besides Israeli ele-
ments first learned of the massacre, 
and whether they did a/J they could to 
stop it or at least to immediately bring 
the reports in their possession to 
Israel and other elements. (emphasis 
added) 
The Sunday Times of London 
reported in January of this year 
[1983] that US officials in Beirut 
learned of the massacre only a few 
hours after it was begun but did not 
act rather than compromise their 
intelligence sources. 
The Inquiry was full of 
sound and fury, but 
ultimately, for the Pal-
estinians and others 
massacred, signifies 
nothing. 
The mechanisms for justice are in 
place. Among other international 
law principles, the Geneva Conven -
tions and the Nuremberg Principles 
provide a widely accepted interna-
tional framework for resolution of 
responsibility and punishment for 
the atrocities. The Kahan Report, n' 
matter how well intentioned, failed t 
result in any meaningful sanction 
Begin, Sharon, and Shamir were all 
criticized by the Commission-yet 
Begin just recently retired; Shamir 
became the new Prime Minister; and 
Sharon remained in the Cabinet 
(athough without his portfolio) . The 
Report may have appeased many 
consciences, but wrongly so-the 
inquiry was full of sound and fury, 
but ultimately, for the Palestinians 
and others massacred, signifies 
nothing . • 
